Violent and Religious Extremism in Kenya: A Conflict Analysis of Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale Counties

A study conducted by Horn of Africa Consulting Link for Africa Peace Forum in Partnership with CRISP

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIAI	Al-Ittihaad al-Islami
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APFO	Africa Peace Forum
ATPU	Anti-Terror Police Unit
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Early Response
CIPK	Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CTC	Counter-Terrorism Centre
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
FBO	Faith Based Organization
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HSM	Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
KECOSCE	Kenya Community Support Center
KEMYA	Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
MSM	Mwambao Separatist Movement
NCRS	National Counter Radicalization Strategy
NRI	National Research Institute
NSA	Non State Actor
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
RAN	Radicalization Awareness Network
RE	Religious Extremism
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
UN-CCT	UN Center on Counter-Terrorism

UN-CTED	United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate
UN-CTITF	United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
POCA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
POCAMLA	Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PPS	Partnership for Peace and Security
POTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act

Definitions of Terms and Concepts

Counter-Radicalization:
Counter-radicalization refers to a process of interaction through which individuals come to reject the legitimacy of violence as a means to achieve a specific political or ideological objective.[1]

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): CVE denotes proactive actions to counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers to violence and to address specific factors that facilitate violent extremist recruitment and radicalization to violence. This includes both disrupting the tactics used by violent extremists to attract new recruits to violence and building specific alternatives, narratives, capabilities, and resiliencies in targeted communities and populations to reduce the risk of radicalization and recruitment to violence. CVE can be a targeted component of larger efforts to pro-mote good governance and the rule of law, respect for human rights, and sustainable, inclusive development. CVE involves reducing the terrorist threat through non-coercive approaches that addresses its root causes. CVE has three main action levels, namely working with governments to encourage national and international approaches at the policy level; building the capacity of local actors to deliver new interventions that make individuals and communities less susceptible to violent extremism; and engaging with state actors to promote activity and behavior that pacifies the threat.

Push factors: Structural push factors are the socio-political conditions which favor the rise and spread of armed extremist groups, and those sometimes used by these groups to create propaganda narratives.

Pull factors: The "pull" factors have a more direct influence on the individual and are associated with the personal rewards an individual may gain through membership in a religious extremist group such as social status, financial gain, personal empowerment and sense of glory. Socio-political conditions which favor the rise and spread of armed extremist groups, and those sometimes used by these groups to create propaganda narratives. The "pull" factors have a more direct influence on the individual and are associated with the personal rewards an individual may gain through membership in a religious extremist group such as social status, financial gain, personal empowerment and sense of glory.

Radicalization: Radicalization refers to a process by which a person, to a large extent, accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific political and/or ideological objective.

Violent Extremism: The purpose of violent extremism is to provoke the target into a disproportionate response, radicalize moderates and build support for its objectives in the long term.

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[1] Listing of concepts follows alphabetical order

Maps

Figure 1: Map of Kenya showing Counties[2]

Source: www.devolutionplanning.go.ke/images/The%20Map%20of%20Kenya.pdf

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[2] Source: *www.devolutionplanning.go.ke/images/The%20Map%20of%20Kenya.pdf*

Figure 2: Map of Mandera County[3]

Source: http://www.maphill.com/kenya/n-eastern/mandera/simple-maps/silver-style-map/

Figure 3: Map of Mombasa County[4]

Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mombasa_County.jpg

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Figure 4: Map of Kwale County[5]

Source: www.maphill.com/kenya/coast/kwale/

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[5] www.maphill.com/kenya/coast/kwale/

Part One

1. Executive Summary

1.1. Overview

This report presents findings of a conflict analysis on violent and religious extremism in three sample counties in northeastern Kenya and the Coast, namely; Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale. The three are part of the six Counties in which the project is being piloted. Mandera is the furthest County of North Eastern Kenya constitutes part of the Mandera Transnational Border Triangle with active socio-economic & political interactions with Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. Mandera has high propensity for extremist groups to recruit youth into active Violent Extremism. Kwale is the only county of Kenya's South Coast and shares an international border with the Republic of Tanzania. The county has extensive rural communities interspersed with semi-urban and urban settlement including forested habitats. Kwale has high propensity for youth recruitment into active Violent Extremism. Most of Mombasa constitutes the urban and semi-urban communities and has strategic socio-economic and political interests for the entire Coastal region, mainland Kenya, the Eastern Africa Region and Great Lakes region. Similarly Mombasa has high propensity for youth' recruitment into active Violent Extremism. The study addresses the problem of escalation of violent extremism in Kenya with a focus on six Eastern counties of Kenya, namely, Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu, Mombasa and Kwale. Kenya has recently grappled with challenges of violent extremism and religious extremism (VE-RE) in a number of counties[6] as manifested through youth radicalization, recruitment into extremist groups and susceptibility to increased terror attacks from within and without the borders. Objectives of the study are: to identify the actors with critical roles in contributing to violent extremism in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale counties of Kenya; to determine the causes of VE in the context of push and pull factors in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale counties of Kenya; to identify approaches to deal with identified key VE gaps in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale counties of Kenya; and to identify existing CVE activities for key stakeholders in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale counties of Kenya. The study responds to four research questions, namely: who are the actors with critical roles in contributing to VE in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale counties of Kenya?; what are the causes, in the context of push and pull factors, contributing to VE in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale counties of Kenya?; how can the identified gaps, in dealing with VE, be addressed?; and what is the role of key CVE stakeholders in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale counties of Kenya? The study was implemented by Africa Peace Forum (APFO) in partnership with CRISP and aimed to build a credible knowledge base for informing immediate implementation of "Social Dialogue Ambassadors: Countering Religious Extremism in Kenya through Youth Involvement" as well as future programming work for APFO in partnership with CRISP of Germany.

The study ascertained that prior to Kenya Defense Forces' (KDF) military intervention in Somalia in 2011 the Kenya community peace networks sustained some uniquely informal moratorium of

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[6] Terms of Reference for consultant to conduct Conflict Analysis and Stakeholder Mapping in Three Counties in Kenya

peaceful co-existence between Kenyan communities and religious extremists along the porous 700-kilometre Kenya-Somali border. The launch of the military operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) by KDF in October 2011 targeting Al-Shabaab within Somalia, and the reorganization of *Al-Shabaab* leadership by the late Ahmed Abdi Godane in June 2013 has profoundly emboldened Al-*Shabaab's* violent assaults in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale counties.

Respondents identified three structural push factors that pre-dominantly influence recruitment, radicalization and religious extremism. Firstly is poverty that causes unprecedented vulnerability among the youth and thus subjecting them to susceptibility of Al-Shabaab recruiters. Youth respondents particularly emphasized that the success of Al-Shabaab in winning support of local religious extremists is related to poverty, deprivation and sense of hopelessness. Secondly is unemployment particularly among the youth creating a constituency of youth who are idle and holding a perception of powerlessness, alienation and marginalization. Economic underdevelopment constitutes the third key factor influencing recruitment, radicalization and religious extremism. The study found that pull factors are the most compelling contributors to Al-Shabaab recruitment. Individuals often fall prey of religious extremism in pursuit of personal agenda and rewards. The pull factors offer insights to the issue of **how** individuals get involved in religious extremism entities (the process) while the push factors explain **why** individuals join religious extremist entities. At the situational and socio-cultural level religious extremism recruiters exert manipulative tactics, including propaganda and false promises, which legitimize narratives for religious extremism. One compelling narrative espoused by Salafism is that pure and authentic life is impossible under a secular state because it does not allow Muslims to live in conformity with the Islamic Sharia law.

Overall the escalation of radicalization and religious extremism is attributable to spread of Salafi Mosques, Salafi Madrassa, Salafi-inspired social media, and transnational movement of devoted Salafi missionaries within Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale who mobilize Islamic identity politics. The Salafi expound a specific conservative and politically active religious mysticism aimed at sustaining transnational appeal while maintaining local, national and international presence and influence. The Salafi inclination manifests itself in religious extremism and radicalized Islamism that actively supports recruitment into Al-Shabaab and its allied groups. Al Shabaab's local Kenyan affiliate is Al Hijra that has intensified active religious extremism in Mandera, Mombasa, and Kwale. Al-Shabaab maintains allegiance of violent extremists through interplay of drivers on several levels, including structural push conditions of poverty and grievances pertaining to lack of participation in governance processes, violations of human rights, lack of access to justice, and socio-cultural and economic marginalization. The study also found that susceptible individuals are influenced by socialization and group dynamics such as family, peers and school. Individual psychological and emotional factors, including need for belonging, dignity, fulfillment, and revenge constitute other factors that explain why individuals joins extremist groups. A notable pull factor is extremism messaging that inspires violence and is disseminated through preaching in Mosques, socialization and education processes at Madrassa, and communication through intricate social media which constitutes strategic public relations machinery and information war disseminating jihadist ideology. Al-Shabaab social media platform includes online newsletters *Gaidi Mtaani, Amka* magazines, *and* online video *Mujahideen Moments.* The platforms features eloquent narratives against Kenya security apparatus framed on

historical and religious-political tensions, grievances and perception of marginalization. Such media strategy and tact connotes warfare instrument to optimize outreach, publicity, recruitment and radicalization. Another growing Al-Shabaab trend is escalation of reinforcements from a wing of foreign fighters, known as *Ansar al Mujahideen*, whose extremists hail from Kenya, Tanzania, Comoros Islands, and Somali Diaspora, Afghanistan, and some European Countries. Al-Shabaab is also inspired by mujahedeen revolutionary doctrines in Afghanistan, Iraq and various Arab Countries.[7]

Corruption is a significant negative factor contributing to Al-Shabaab's continued infiltration of Kenyan communities while simultaneously escalating attacks in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale Counties.[8] Discernible Al-Shabaab's operations and influence in the sample counties implies that religious extremism has permeated strategic Kenya based milieu that supports, or otherwise protects the group's economic lifeline. Slackness from a section of security and immigration officers has a role in protracting and protecting religious extremism. Slackness is a manifestation of deeply entrenched corruption that enables Al-Shabaab to operate smuggling cartels for both human and goods as well as elaborate human trafficking system. Corruption impels religious extremists' socio-economic pedestal that funds violent incursions.

The study identified two distinct, albeit converse, roles of women that have ramifications on religious extremism. Firstly are actions in support of religious extremism. Increasingly Al-Shabaab is intent on recruiting females due to general profiling by security agents targeting males and thus making women extremists more effective for recruitment, radicalization, and surveillance supporting extremist agenda. There is increasing presence of female Al-Shabaab members within Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale. Another trend is that young girls are recruited for marriage by Al-Shabaab extremists. Secondly is the converse and positive influence by some women who dissuade potential recruits from joining extremist groups. This is more so if the mother-child bond and family ties are strong. Mothers and other female relatives who disapprove extremism are most likely to be effective in dissuading their female and male relatives from joining and supporting extremism networks.

Mandera is strategic to Al-Shabaab due to its position as a border county with the Republic of Somalia and the Republic of Ethiopia, while radicalization and religious extremism in Mombasa is influenced by a growing constituency of youth militancy as a spill-over effect of Al-Shabaab, Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) and other organized gangs. The main areas of Mombasa County that are significantly affected by radicalization and religious extremism are Kisauni, Mvita and Likoni. The Kenya security agencies have attempted to link the escalation of Al-Shabaab's violent activities with the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) possibly due to past historical trends of agitation for coastal secessionist spearheaded by MRC. While Al-Shabaab is keenly attempting to recruit from MRC's more militant-inclined periphery, the prevailing view from respondents is that the existing linkage between MRC and Al-Shabaab is merely personal inclination rather than organizational inclination. Somehow violence perpetrated by youth gangs within Mombasa escalates

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[7] Information shared by a youthful respondent, aged 25 years, during a Key Informant Interview at Mvita area of Mombasa County
[8] Views shared during FGDs in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale Counties of Kenya. Respondents for FGDs were multi-sectoral representing a cross-section of stakeholders.

simultaneously as the MRC and Al-Shabaab activities increase and consequently violent youth gangs are occasionally confused with violent extremism and religious extremism due to the fact that gang members predominantly target non-Muslims. In Kwale County the interplay of Al-Shabaab, MRC and other organized gangs is also notable. Matuga Sub-County leads among areas significantly affected by radicalization and religious extremism in Kwale while Gombogombato village is particularly susceptible to Al-Shabaab recruitment. Another significant phenomenon in Kwale is a spate of retaliatory killings that in the past has forced local Muslim clerics, chiefs and village heads to go into hiding for fear of militants disillusioned with the government amnesty and "rehabilitation" for religious extremist returnees.[9]

1.2. Conclusion

Structural push factors such as poverty, economic underdevelopment, deprivation, and perceptions of marginalization and powerlessness influence recruitment, radicalization and religious extremism. The youth are particularly susceptible and constitute the main target by Al-Shabaab' propaganda. Pull factors are immensely compelling contributors to Al-Shabaab recruitment because individuals join religious extremism units in pursuit of personal rewards such as need for belonging, dignity, personal fulfillment, and eternal magnificence. Salafism has a special appeal through a narrative promoting militancy in pursuit of pure and authentic life in conformity with the Islamic Sharia law. Salafism theology, that inspires Al-Shabaab, contradicts other Islamic theologies such as Sufism and has hence led to notable sectarianism in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale counties. Conversely Sufism theology promotes dialogue, tolerance, and peaceful interfaith relations. The escalation of religious extremism affirms the need for strengthened community-led and community-based CVE resilience. Community CVE resilience is likely to be more sustainable if community-based entities actively participate in CVE efforts. The capacity of youth-led and women-led groups and organizations is particularly significant for embedding communities' CVE resilience. Strategic and innovative community initiatives are necessary for nurturing relevant, effective and sustainable CVE efforts that are inspired by pro-CVE constituency comprising Muslims, Imams, youth, women, educators, leaders and other Non State Actors within Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale counties. While the sample for this study are Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale Counties, the prevailing trend is relevant for the entire six target Eastern Kenya counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu, Mombasa and Kwale under the "Social Dialogue Ambassadors: Countering Religious Extremism in Kenya through Youth Involvement."

1.3. Recommendations

State Actors

1. Support efforts that strengthen the capacity of County-level governance in entrenching participatory governance and protection of social-cultural and political rights, as well as human rights

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[9] The Crisis Group Africa, (2016), Kenya's Coast: Devolution Disappointed Briefing N°12. Nairobi/Brussels

2. Delineate values, principles and standards that constitute government's thresholds in addressing religious extremism. Such thresholds should include commitment to international human rights law, commitment to the Bill of Rights as embedded in the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, and other policy, strategies and laws of Kenya that are based on a constitutional framework

3. Embed a Counter Violent Extremism platform (policies, strategies, laws, procedures, programs, projects etc.) elucidating governments' Counter-radicalization and de-radicalization as strategically long-term and sustainable interventions

4. Embed the principle of "Strengthening Human Rights" in missions, goals, programs and interventions that address religious extremism and institute pragmatic mechanism for ensuring commitment to human rights through a multi-sectoral and inter-agency approach. It is imperative that security operations and paramilitary operations adhere to the rule of law by protecting constitutional rights

5. Adhere to best practices emanating from the Global War on Terror (GWOT) towards integrating CVE in trainings for all police and military divisions

6. Consider reframing the official narrative on Counter Violent Extremism and Counter-Terrorism to include securing the porous border with Somalia as a high priority commitment that fits within an amended *Operation Linda Nchi", to include* revising the immigration processes and systems for curbing human smuggling and trafficking

7. Support participatory Madrassa and Mosque reform that is Muslim-driven to institute a standardized Madrassa education framework and Mosque management parameters

8. Establish a pro-active State and Non State Actors cooperation and partnerships to consolidate and harmonize synergy of diverse stakeholders including the political, civic, religious, socio-cultural, and economic sectors through multi-sectoral and multi-agency programming

Non State Actors focusing on CSOs

1. Initiate programming efforts that strengthen, nurture and protect local resilience to violent extremism. For example there is need to strengthen County-level peace committees, local peace champions and social-dialogue ambassadors

2. Enhance efforts that raise awareness about local rights, communities' rights, as well as responsibilities, for purposes of entrenching authentic CVE initiatives that are relevant, responsive, preventive and community-led

3. Integrate peace education in CVE programming

4. Support efforts that link local CVE actions with national CVE policies and initiatives

5. Strengthen women-led community based groups/organizations and institutions for embedding locally sustainable community resilience

6. Enhance the role of youth-led community-based groups/organizations and institutions in embedding locally sustainable community resilience

7. Design and implement CVE interventions that attain requisite thresholds pertaining to values, principles and best practices for community participation, local ownership, transparency and coordination

8. Design and implement CVE interventions that pro-actively responds to the local context in terms of specific CVE needs, perceptions, vulnerabilities, resilience and sustainability potential

9. Integrate participatory monitoring and evaluation (PME) through inclusiveness and community participation throughout the program/project life cycle (needs identification, inception, design, implementation, and evaluation)
10. Where partnership is allowable ensure that vetting, mapping and targeting guidelines and procedures are documented to facilitate transparency in selecting credible partners who adhere to thresholds of tolerance for diversity, legitimacy in Countering Violent Extremism, as well as ethical and integrity thresholds
11. Institutionalize a platform of Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation that supports documentation, learning, reporting/dissemination, adapting and sustainability as assessed through a combination of logical framework and results based management standards
12. Support efforts that strengthen the capacity of County-level governance in entrenching participatory governance and protection of social-cultural and political rights, as well as human rights

Non State Actors focusing on FBOs (Mosques, Madrassa and Imams)

1. Cooperate and partner with national and county governments to implement reforms targeting the Madrassa education system and particularly to design a standardized Madrassa curriculum and syllabus. An entry point for introducing Madrassa' reform ideas and concepts is designing of modest strategic documents for Madrassa and Mosques that can gradually broaden their mandate and legitimacy to accommodate debates for Madrassa education reforms. The reform agenda has to adhere to the values of Muslim integration and Muslim rights to Islamic faith
2. Cooperate and partner with both State and other Non State Actors to facilitate effective, legitimate and community-based Counter Violent Extremism interventions

Part Two

2. Situational and Contextual Analysis

In 1980 a terror attack instigated by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) targeted the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi and another assault by Al-Qaeda–linked terrorists targeted the U.S. embassy in Nairobi nearly two decades ago (August 1998). In November 2002 terrorists launched another significant attack on Israel-owned Paradise Hotel[10] in Kikambala at the Kenyan coast. Thereafter, for a decade, Kenya did not experience major terrorist threat emanating from either global or local religious extremism. This decade old aura permeating peace, security and stability for Kenya existed in the midst of Al-Shabaab and its affiliates controlling most of south-central Somalia since 2008 while Al-Shabaab and allied groups reportedly existed in Kenya since 2009. It was not until a wave of cross-border kidnappings, targeting foreign tourists and humanitarian workers at Kenya's Dadaab Refugee Camp, that the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) was lured to instigate a military offensive against the Al-Shabaab in Somalia beginning October 2011. The joint KDF military offensive, code-named "Operation Linda Nchi," had 3,000 KDF personnel partnering with the Somali Armed Forces[11] for "coordinated pre-emptive actions" against Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia. At the time of this study the KDF are still in Somalia as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) after the Operation Linda Nchi ended in May 2012. The AMISOM started is an UN-backed regional peace support mission constituted by 22 000 troops from six African countries.

This study ascertained that prior to the 2011 KDF military intervention in Somalia; the Kenya community peace networks sustained some uniquely informal moratorium of peaceful co-existence between Kenyan communities and religious extremists along the porous 700-kilometre Kenya-Somali border. Respondents in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale informed this study that the advent of Operation Linda Nchi marked the beginning of unrelenting Al-Shabaab attacks incrementally growing in quantity, sophistication, enormity and to some extent precision. For example there were thirty two (32) recorded Al-Shabaab attacks in 2011 compared to eighty four (84) in 2014. While some of the attacks are characterized by throwing hand grenade, the most lethal assaults by Al-Shabaab was the 2013 attack on Nairobi's Westgate Mall that had 67 people killed, the 2015 attack at Garissa University College that had 148 people dead, and the attack at Mpeketoni community of Lamu County that had seventy (70) people dead. This study confirmed that despite the geographical spread of Al-Shabaab attacks that include Nairobi, there is peculiar intensification of recruitment, radicalization and spread of religious extremism in the Eastern Kenya counties including Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu, Mombasa and Kwale.

Overall the escalation of radicalization and religious extremism in Kenya is attributable to spread of Salafi mosques, transnational movement of devoted Salafi missionaries, and systematic mobilisation of Islamic identity politics globally often working in partnership with charities from the Gulf States. The Salafi preaches a particular conservative and politically active religious mysticism aimed at sustaining transnational appeal, presence and influence. In Kenya the Salafi inclination manifests

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[10] Menkhaus, K., (2015). Conflict Assessment: Northern Kenya and Somaliland. Danish Demining Group
[11] Villa-Vicencio, C., Buchanan-Clarke, S. and Humphrey A., (2016), Community Perceptions of Violent Extremism in Kenya

itself in religious extremism and specifically radicalized Islamism that actively supports recruitment into Al-Shabaab and its allied groups. Al Shabaab's local Kenyan affiliate is Al Hijra and has intensified active recruitment, radicalization and religious extremism in Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu, Mombasa, and Kwale.

This study notes that the wrath and antics of Al-Shabaab against Kenya is traceable to multifaceted context of geographic, regional, historical, political, economic and socio-cultural factors. Foremost is Kenya's ties with Israel and western countries including the US and members of the European Union while secondly is the coast's geographic situation and strategic location relative to Europe, Asia, and other countries of Eastern, Central and Horn of Africa. Kenya is also susceptible due to a 700 km long, porous and unmanned border with Somalia to the East, and a porous border with South Sudan to the North West. For decades Kenya has maintained an open attitude to migrants and hosts multinational and multicultural society that also exposes the country to religious extremists. Kenya has a relatively stable transport and communications infrastructure. These and other multifaceted factors for Kenya attract both allies as well as antagonist such as the Al-Shabaab.

Respondents stated that corruption is a significant aspect, albeit negative, contributing to Al-Shabaab's continued infiltration of Kenyan communities while simultaneously recruiting, radicalizing and escalating religious extremists' attacks within Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale Counties.[12] Perceptible Al-Shabaab's operations and influence in the sampled counties implies, to some extent, that this religious extremist' unit permeates a strategic Kenya based milieu that supports, or otherwise protects its Kenyan economic lifeline. This survey found that slackness from a section of security and immigration officers has a role in protracting and protecting religious extremism. Respondents averred that the nature of slackness emanating from security, immigration and custom officers is a manifestation of deeply entrenched corruption that enables Al-Shabaab to operate illegal trade and smuggling cartels and hence offering religious extremists an economic pedestal that funds violent incursions. A respondent in Mombasa stated that Al-Shabaab funds intricate counter-intelligence maneuvers whose success thrives, partly, on some compromised officers of the Kenya Police, immigration, customs and border patrol services. Al-Shabaab agents pay the target officers money, illegally and corruptly, to entice and compromise them. A respondent in Kwale[13] asserted that Al-Shabaab maintains a sympathetic team of Kenya-based business and employees in diverse department, including public service vehicle (PSV) crews, who are well versed with the attitude of the security, immigration and customs officers and are able to interact with them freely and easily to transact corrupt deals. Pertaining to migration, human smuggling and trafficking is majorly influenced by Somali out-migration particularly across the Gulf of Aden to Yemen and overland to Kenya and Ethiopia and constitutes significant transit zones for eventual migration to Saudi Arabia, Europe and US for mainly young people. The Mandera triangle, offering access to Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia, particularly permeates high-level corruption, trafficking and smuggling due to its strategic link with the commercial hubs of Wajir, Garissa and Nairobi. One key finding of this study is that Mandera County has a tri- tier status as source, transit, and destination for human smuggling and trafficking,

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[12] Views shared during FGDs in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale Counties of Kenya. Respondents for FGDs were multi-sectoral representing a cross-section of stakeholders.
[13] Respondent during an FGD at Ukunda of Kwale County

and rampant corruption. The "north eastern transit route" originating in Mandera is a nosh for corruption along Mandera-Wajir-Garissa-Mwingi-Thika-Nairobi, and constitutes a strategic base that corruptly nourishes two other routes, namely the "Western route" between Kenya and Uganda thriving on Busia-Malaba border zones, and the "Coast route" that links Nairobi with the border zone of Lamu, Vanga and Taveta.

Two significant episodes appear to have profoundly emboldened Al-*Shabaab's* violent assaults targeting Mandera County. Foremost is the launch of the military operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) by Kenya Defence Forces in October 2011 targeting Al-Shabaab within Somalia, and secondly the reorganization of *Al-Shabaab* leadership by the late Ahmed Abdi Godane in June 2013. Godane reorganized *Al-Shabaab's* military wing, *Jaysh al-Usra,* focusing to escalate crossborder Jihad missions. The reorganization intensified the resolve of Al-Shabaab commander for the Gedo region of Somalia, Adan Garar, to expand terror maneuvers into Mandera County. Mandera is greatly strategic to Al-Shabaab due to its position as a border county with the Republic of Somalia and the Republic of Ethiopia and thus Al-Shabaab incursions were beyond Mandera. While Al-Shabaab's incursions in Mandera escalated, simultaneously the commander for the Lower and Middle Juba, the late Mohamed Kunow Dulyadeyn (alias Gamadhere) expanded Al-Shabaab operations in Wajir and Garissa counties. Simultaneously Kenya's *Al-Shabaab* division, *Al-Hijra,* conglomerated with a new military unit, *Jaysh Ayman* comprised of Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian nationals. *Jaysh Ayman* was predestined to wage violent extremism in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (Chome, 2016)[14]. The merger marked a shift in strategy as Al-Shabaab reinvented itself from a Religious Extremist rebel group based in southern Somalia into a more organized entity intent on waging insurgency in Ethiopia, southern Somalia, and Kenya. During the period 2013 to 2016 Al-Shabaab terror activities in Eastern Kenya, and beyond, were more sophisticated and lethal as witnessed in Mandera bus and quarry attacks in November 2014, Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi in 2013, and the Lamu County attacks in June and July 2014.

Religious extremism in Mombasa is influenced by various actors, namely Al-Shabaab, Mombasa Republican Council and other armed gangs.

Al-Shabaab: Terrorism in the coast region of Kenya is traceable to the 2002 bombing of Paradise Hotel in Kikambala. An allure of peace permeated for a decade in the region until threats of Al-Shabaab violent extremism started emerging since 2011. On 14th March 2014 a car carrying two improvised bombs was impounded and two terrorists arrested. Less than two months later (3-May-2014) there were two twin terrorists' assaults with fatalities of three people. The violent attacks are linked to growing youth militancy within Mombasa. Respondents identified Masjid Sakina mosque situated within Majengo region of Mombasa where radicalized youth violently evicted the moderate Imam and the mosque caretaker committee before symbolically hoisting flags bearing Al-Shabaab signature as a sign of victory. The moderate Imam at Masjid Sakina (Mohamed, 2014) was the chairperson of the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK) who asserted his opposition to extremist views and was later assassinated (Kithure and Bosire, 2014). The study found that between

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[14] Chome, Ngala. (2016). *Violent Extremism and Clan Dynamics in Kenya,* USIP, Washington, DC

2013 and 2014 three mosques were violently taken over in Mombasa by radicalized groups (Kithuure and Bosire, 2014). The security agencies' counter-response operations, including closure of mosques that were perceived to be active in youth radicalization, often degenerated into violent disputes between the invading youth and the police. Respondents asserted that the main areas of Mombasa County that are significantly affected by radicalization and religious extremism are Kisauni, Mvita and Likoni (Vittori and Bremer, 2009).

Mombasa Republican Council: Kenya security agencies have attempted to link the escalation of Al-Shabaab's violent activities with the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) possibly due to past historical trends that had the coastal region intensify coastal secessionist' clamor. The MRC has remained largely amorphous while the government consistently declined to engage MRC on the issues driving the entity. The study found that the government' policy of non-engagement on MRC issues was a risky position that intensified coastal communities' perception of marginalization and left a social-political space that the Al-Shabaab is keen to occupy by hijacking and advancing MRC clamor for social justice. The coastal communities informed this study that the Al-Shabaab is keenly attempting to recruit from MRC's more militant inclined periphery. The more prevailing view from Mombasa respondents is that the existing linkage between MRC and Al-Shabaab is merely personal inclination rather than organizational inclination.

Other Violent Youth Gangs: Somehow violence perpetrated by youth gangs within and around Mombasa escalated simultaneously as the MRC and Al-Shabaab-related ones escalated. Respondents asserted that the activities of violent youth gangs are occasionally confused with violent extremism and religious extremism due to the fact that gang members particularly in Kisauni predominantly target non-Muslim pedestrians and passengers in *matatus.* The study was informed that gang members are occasionally hired by politicians to threaten and intimidate opponents. The result of this is a vicious cycle that sustains gang-mentality since politicians who feel threatened are compelled to hire youth for protection. While politicians at the national stage are traditionally the beneficiaries of gangs for hire, the same inclination has not spared the county governments. Increasingly national and county government leaders pay for their private security facet alongside the public security services provided by the government.

Matuga Sub-County leads in Kwale County among areas significantly affected by radicalization and religious extremism. The study found that Gombogombato village is particularly susceptible to Al-Shabaab recruitment into extremist groups. Kwale County has recently witnessed a spate of retaliatory killings that started in Msambweni, where a number of local clerics, chiefs and village headmen had to go into hiding for fear that militants disillusioned with the government amnesty and "rehabilitation" programs were targeting them. Civil society organisations (CSOs), too, are increasingly reluctant to engage in CVE work given the parallel hard security measures and since the two leading coastal CSOs had their assets frozen for alleged links with terrorism.[15]

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[15] The Crisis Group Africa, (2016), Kenya's Coast: Devolution Disappointed Briefing N°12. Nairobi/Brussels

2.1. Factors Influencing Radicalization and Religious Extremism

Factors influencing recruitment, radicalization and embodiment of religious extremism within the sampled study counties of Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale are diverse with a tendency to vary for particular communities and geographical sites. For Al-Shabaab to continue winning local support they tactfully contextualize the overriding narrative and hence the recruitment and radicalization strategies remain highly dynamic rather than latent. The study found that overall, Al-Shabaab's relevance and knack to expand recruits depends on exploitation of diverse dynamics such as structural, socio-cultural and individual 'push' and 'pull' factors. This study avers that the process of finding and converting a potential recruit is an intricate psychosocial process. The study ascertained that within the sample counties of Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale Counties Al-Shabaab exploits vulnerabilities of socio-economic, political, and individual nature to appeal to potential recruits and particularly susceptible youth.

Poverty: Respondents asserted that poverty has created unprecedented vulnerability among the youth and thus subjecting them to susceptibility of Al-Shabaab recruiters. Youth respondents particularly emphasized that the success of Al-Shabaab in winning support of local religious extremists is related to poverty, deprivation and sense of hopelessness.

Unemployment: Respondents explained that unemployment among the youth implies that at a given time, in the contemporary period of study, there is a constituency of youth who are idle. Unemployed youth feel powerless and internalize a perception of being alienated from the mainstream community. The youth constitute a vulnerable sub-community that remains a primary target for recruitment, radicalization and religious extremism. Youthful respondents particularly emphasized that that majority of unemployed youth are more inclined to find solace in networks that earns them some source of income and livelihood. The study asked the respondents to provide specific example of the form of reward that make youth join and continue supporting the violent mission of Al-Shabaab. Respondents asserted that in Mandera Al-Shabaab pays Kes.5, 000 to Kes.15, 000 monthly to a youth who joins and implements surveillance missions supportive of religious extremism. Nonetheless the monthly reward varies depending on the intensity of missions supportive of religious extremism and the level of risk to a supporter. Elderly men and female respondents were less inclined to perceiving unemployment as a key factor leading to Al-Shabaab recruiting, radicalizing and sustaining religious extremism.

Economic underdevelopment: All categories of respondents, including youthful females and males as well as adult males and females asserted that economic underdevelopment is a manifestation of alienation, economic, social and political marginalization that is profoundly influential narrative used by Al-Shabaab recruiters. According to the respondents, the perceived alienation of communities within Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale counties partly explains why Al-Shabaab is able to recruit relatively educated youth and youth from wealthy families. The religious extremists are majorly inspired by extremist Salafi teachings that advocate for socio-cultural, economic and political transformation aimed at creating a Salafi inclined religious-polity. Respondents in Kwale explained that unemployed youth are the primary target of Al-Shabaab recruiters who prey into their

desperation, hopelessness and idleness by promising them life-long source of income and livelihood security. The most common thread among the youth respondents in Kwale is that the recruiters promise monthly cash payments for youth who return from Somalia after completing the cycle of religious extremism featuring recruitment, radicalization and training for active terrorism combat within Somalia Al-Shabaab training camps. To effectively recruit the youth, the recruiting agents offer narratives that resonate with historical grievances among communities in Kwale, and particularly the social justice agenda of the MRC. The MRC has been in the forefront championing socio-cultural and economic rights among the indigenous Miji Kenda communities of coastal Kenya. A key MRC theme for addressing historical grievances and restoring social justice is a form of affirmative action that offers priority during employment to the youth and people of the Miji Kenda indigenous communities. It is not surprising therefore that Al-Shabaab wins the support of youth who perceive that the terrorist entity is offering a life-long solution to the issue of youth unemployment and related social marginalization.

2.2. Pull Factors in the context of Youth Radicalization

The study found that pull factors are the most compelling contributors to Al-Shabaab recruitment in Kenya. Individuals often fall prey of radicalization and religious extremism in pursuit of various personal agenda and rewards. The pull factors provide hints on the radicalization process and the factors that lure the individual into joining extremist entities and groups and taking action on behalf of the religious extremism groups. In essence the pull factors offer insights to the issue of *how* individuals get involved in religious extremism entities (the process). Conversely the push factors explain *why* individuals join religious extremist entities (the reasons). The study found that at the situational and socio-cultural level recruiters for religious extremism exert manipulative tactics such as propaganda and false promises. The ensuing propaganda and talking points form the basis for legitimizing narratives for religious extremism.

Kenya is constituted by people of diverse ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds with a predominant African population as well as significant population of Indians, Arabs and Europeans. The 2009 census found that the Kenyan Muslim community is approximately 9%, which is 3.3 million out of the total population of 38.6 million. Kenya Muslims are as diverse as the entire Kenya population and are drawn from the whole spectrum of Kenya society. However the Somali people of North Eastern Kenya and people of Arabic descent of the Kenya coast are predominantly Muslims. The Muslim community has a large proportion of youth aged 18 - 35 years constituting 65%. The youth at the Kenyan coast region constitute approximately 9% of Kenya's youth (Njonjo, 2010).

Salafi and Islamic radicalization: The religious-political narrative espoused by an emerging generation of Salafi radicalisms is precisely that pure and authentic life is impossible under a secular state particularly because it does not allow Muslims to live, not least because it did not allow Muslims to live in conformity with Islamic Sharia law (ICG, 2012). The Salafist narrative is explicit that the Muslim minorities should not cooperate with the state but rather take either of the two options, namely to emigrate or fight alongside the separatists. Consequently the Salafi has created a mainly

insular, puritanical and conservative Muslim populace that has emboldened sectarian animosities while weakening moderation and tolerance to religious and political pluralism.

During the 20th and 21st Century the Salafi puritanical theology is traceable to revivalist ventures that started in 1950s (ICG, 2005). The spread of Salafi puritanical theology has been aided by globalization, including access to means of communication, making it possible for extremist groups to spread ideas for radicalization to massive populations worldwide. In Kenya the theology of Salafi, including the strand of Wahhabism, has attracted significant following among Kenya Muslims (Botha, 2013) for over four decades.

A notable Salafi Islamic wave emerged in 1970s and is remarkable for heightened spread of the Salafi teachings. The genesis of this wave is linked to emergence of Saudi Arabia as a Oil power keen to insert its religious influence globally by overtly undermining the traditional Shaf'i *mazhab* of moderate Sufi and convert their devotees to Salafism (ICG, 2012).   Unlike Sufi spirituality that advocates for tolerance and diversity, the Salafi is devoted to doctrinal purity (Botha, 2013) that is profoundly contradictory to the traditional secular state. A second wave of Islamic radicalization coincided with Iran Islamic revolution in early 1980s and was inspired by the Salafi puritanical theology. This wave reached Kenya through attempts to radicalize the urban settlements of Mombasa and Nairobi which hosts a section of Asian Shia community. This second wave waned in Kenya but resulted to intense sectarian tensions with Wahhabi adherents particularly at the Nairobi Jamia Mosque. The third wave emerged in 1990s and was propelled by an energized generation of Salafi Jihadi militants and groups. The Salafi Jihadi' leaning militants and groups overtly preached puritanical theology and political narrative (ICG, 2012; Botha, 2013) that disdains the secular state. The Jihadists neither invented a new language nor a new theology but simply built on the solid foundation established by their predecessors. The Salafi Jihad preaching gained immense following by elevating the Jihad to as the ultimate and supreme act of faith thriving on the cult of martyrdom that justifies terrorism (ICG, 2012). The overriding narrative is that the umma Islamic community should shun the unbelievers – kaffir *(*Moshe, 2007) if the umma was to absolve itself from the past cooperation with the kaffir. Essentially the narrative asserted that jihad was meant to emancipate the *umma* in preparation for the Day of Judgment. The Salafi Jihad narrative is that the war on kaffir has to be fought simultaneously globally and locally and hence the need to recruit local fighters (Moshe, 2007). Al-Qaeda remained the custodian of this violent narrative and by early 1990s the Al-Qaeda terrorist entity had created strategic links with the al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI) which is an armed Islamist movement that waged a violent campaign in south-western Somalia until mid-1990s (Sage, 2001; ICG, 2002). Al-Ittihaad al-Islami reincarnated itself with more violent inclination, first as the Union of Islamic Courts, and later as Al-Shabaab (ICG, 2005; Moshe, 2007). Al-Shabaab and its affiliates have recruited, radicalized and sustained religious extremism in Somalia and Kenya. Recruited adherents cooperate and garner support of communities while also acquiring political and business influence. AIAI was not a chance occurrence but rather a deliberate product of radicalization (ICG, 2012). Al-Ittihaad al-Islami and associated affiliates, including Al-Shabaab has maintained clandestine support network since 1990s in Mandera, Wajir and Garissa counties while strategically recruited violent extremists and mobilized resources. It was not until 2011 that violent extremism groups in Mandera, Wajir and Garissa shunned their hitherto low profile and raised the stakes for

violent expedition within Kenya. More significantly the Al-Ittihaad al-Islami and Al-Shabaab infiltrated the Wahhabi clerical establishment that controlled most mosques in Kenya and gained legitimate space for spreading Salafi puritanical teachings. The religious extremist groups also gained stakes in Islamic Charitable institutions and effectively diverted the *zakat* to support the puritanical Salafist theology, support commercial interests and offer livelihood sustenance to Salafist adherents including newly recruited extremists in Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu, Mombasa and Kwale. The Kenyan Coastal region, including Lamu, Kilifi, Mombasa and Kwale remains strategic to Al-Shabaab (ICG, 2012). Active al-Qaeda cells within the East African Coast were partly responsible for the twin bombing of U.S embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-salaam in 1998. The 2002 bombing of Paradise Hotel in Kikambala was signified manifestation of active local terrorist groups along the coastal region.

Francis (2012) identifies four categories of drivers of youth radicalization, namely situational, strategic, ideological and individual. The study found that for the sampled counties of Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale the inter-play of situational, strategic, ideological and individual factors drives the youth into religious extremism.

Table 1: Drivers of youth radicalization in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale Counties

Category	Sub-Category	Examples from Sampled Counties of Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale
Situational [16]	• Pre-condition: enabling factors	• Ease of inter-country movement (Kenya-Somalia; Kenya-Middle East); intra-country (within Kenya), as well as inter-county (Mandera-Mombasa-Kenya etc.) • Access to Information, Communication & Technology (internet, mobile phone and computers; use of social media such as facebook, WhatsApp, twitter, YouTube etc.) • Al-Shabaab operates a website for mass communication
	• Pre-condition: motivating factors	• Ethnic and religious discrimination and profiling • Inequities in employment; unemployment; marginalization, deprivation and social and economic exclusion • Influence of separatist/extremist groups such as Mwambao Separatist Movement (MSM), Mwambao United Front, Mulungunipa, Kaya Bombo Raiders, Mombasa Republican Council, and Somali secessionist movement/shifta secessionist war of the 1960s, and the defunct Islamic Party of Kenya
	Precipitant Conditions	• Security operations/ counter-terrorism initiatives including mass arrests and racial profiling • Mistrust/ lack of cooperation between security agents and local communities • Kenyan foreign policy and its association with the West • Kenya's October 2011 deployment of KDF in Somalia

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[16] These are factors whose context is at the macro level and influences large number of people such as a country or entire community

Strategic	Short-Term	• Extremists seeking sympathy and craving for political engagement with the state (pronouncements supportive of extremism) • Al-Shabaab publicly taking responsibility for various terrorist attacks in Mandera and Kenya coastal region
	Long-Term	• Al-Shabaab tactfully linking its terror atrocities to the presence of KDF in Somalia has the long-term goal to coerce Kenya to withdraw KDF from the AMISOM
Ideological		• Religious extremism with roots in Somalia inspired by Salafi theology and Kenya's extremist preachers trained in the Middle East who hold divisive anti-Western and Anti-Kenya messages; influence of Salafi doctrine targeting the youth with a message of global Muslim brotherhood
Individual[17]		• The influence of socialization process through the internet, prisons, mosques, family and friendship, structured membership and socialization networks (code of conduct, mentorship, patronage, and incubation/training) • Youth adventure that inspires the youth to challenge the status quo, seeking fulfillment and self actualization; reward system such as gaining glory and heroism inspired by Salafi theological promises of perpetual joy/spiritual rewards for martyrdom • Material rewards such as regular income

The growing prevalence of conservative Salafism in mosques as well as entry of missionaries and charities from the Gulf States has contributed to escalation of religious extremism in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale. Salafism evokes its adherents to retain puritanical spirituality, global Islamic identity politics and activism that contradict certain aspects of Sufism hence the growing manifestations of sectarian polarization, intolerance and violent revolts.[18] Another notable trend for Al-Shabaab is escalation of reinforcements from a wing of foreign fighters, known as *Ansar al Mujahideen,* whose membership includes extremists from Kenya, Tanzania, Comoros Islands, and Somali Diaspora, Afghanistan, and some European Countries. A respondent asserted that Al-Shabaab is also inspired by mujahedeen revolutionary doctrines in Afghanistan, Iraq and various Arab Countries.[19] The foreign extremists offer logistical, tactical and training support to Al Shabaab and its Kenyan wing Al Hijra in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale Counties. Some rallying point for Al-Shabaab in recruiting foreign extremists is the establishment of the US military base and runway at Manda Bay in Lamu County, Kenya security' Counter Insurgency initiatives supported by the US, and increased visibility of the US Civil Affairs teams through the "hearts and minds" campaign. Generally Kenya's proximity to Somalia and Middle East has increasingly attracted transnational extremists. For example, four decades ago (28th January 1976) Kenya thwarted a transnational terrorist plot by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) who schemed to shoot down El AI passenger plan during a stopover in Nairobi (Mogire and Agade, 2011). Four years later the PFLP bombed the Norfolk

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[17] Individual factors usually function at the micro level
[18] Menkhaus, K., (2015). Conflict Assessment: Northern Kenya and Somaliland. Danish Demining Group
[19] Information shared by a youthful respondent, aged 25 years, during a Key Informant Interview at Mvita area of Mombasa County

Hotel in Nairobi in retaliation for Kenya's assistance to Israel during the rescue operation to free hostages at Entebbe Airport in Uganda (Mogire & Agade, 2011). The 1998 American embassy attack in Nairobi was planned by foreign terrorists collaborating with local terror cells. The transnational link involved Osama Bin Laden, a Palestinian al Qaida member from Jordan, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed from Comoros Islands, two Saudis, and a support network by extremist Kenyan citizens (Vittori et al., 2009). In 2002 some foreign al- Qaida affiliates bombed Paradise Hotel in Kikambala in Mombasa. The 2013 Westgate attack by extremists was claimed by Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaida affiliate in Somalia, and there are possibilities that the attackers received financial and tactical support[20] from the core of al-Qaida in Pakistan and globally.

A section of Kenya Muslim community has media that is pro-Islam (*Da'wah* activities) as well as focusing on socio-political messaging. This study found that generally the pro-Islam media does not have inter-faith programs. Conversely, there is also pro-Christian media some of which focuses on programs that are overtly hostile to inter-faith/inter-religious orientation. Respondents in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale suggested that overall interreligious/interfaith relations in Kenya are declining following escalation of sectarian media messaging. A notable affront to interfaith and interreligious messaging emanates from Al-Shabaab's social media platforms that have escalated sectarian propaganda war informed majorly by Salafism. Notable Al-Shabaab social media platform includes online newsletters *Gaidi Mtaani, Amka* magazines, *and* online video *Mujahideen Moments.* The media platforms are Salafist inspired and features eloquent arguments against Kenya security apparatus based on historical and religious-political tensions and hence holding potential to win new recruits for radicalization and religious extremism. For example Al-Shabaab's magazines elucidate selected "*historical injustices and grievances,*" ethno-political tensions and the role of transnational jihad. Overall Al-Shabaab has packaged a globalized Salafist message fitting Kenyan context to make it palatable and lure vulnerable youth to religious extremism. For example the platforms legitimize violence as revenge for what they describe as "humiliation suffered by Muslims in Kenya," the "Christian occupation of coastal land," and the "revenge for the killing of prominent Islamic preachers.[21]

Respondents within the sample counties of Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale informed this study that recruiters for Al-Shabaab utilize the media strategically and tactfully as warfare instrument to optimize outreach, publicity and eventual radicalization. Al-Shabaab is increasingly packaging their messages to portray magnificent victory against Kenyan targets, particularly against the KDF, to enhance morale for Al-Shabaab fighters while attempting to demoralize the KDF forces and Kenyan communities. Al-Shabaab utilizes two-thronged media front – firstly through social media to convey specific messages tits followers and potential recruits, and secondly through the traditional media that ordinarily gives priority to cataclysmic and high impact events. A consistent assertion by respondents in all the three sampled counties is that generally the traditional media confers high

[20] Aronson, S.L., (2013). Kenya and the Global War on Terror: Neglecting History and Geopolitics in Approaches to Counterterrorism. African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies (AJCJS, Vol. 7), London School of Economics)
[21] Information shared by an elderly Muslim respondent during a Key Informant Interview at Matuga Sub-County of Kwale County

value to forceful incidents. Consequently the media is more inclined to react, by focusing on emerging episodes, as opposed to preventive coverage. Good intentions notwithstanding, the overall reactionary tendency of the media is tantamount to acknowledging terror perpetrators pertaining to relevance, capacity to achieve goals through violence and political legitimacy through "psycho-social effect" amplification. Essentially Al-Shabaab inaptly manipulates existing socio-economic and political systems – as the mass media engages the audience through mass communication, gains economic profits and consolidates its aficionado' base, the terrorists scores in terms of their tactical and strategic objectives. Albeit is to retaliate that this analysis does not imply any doubt on the good intentions of the media but rather observes that the ensuing symbiosis of Al-Shabaab and media has, to some extent, the effect of Al-Shabaab free-wheeling in the context of massive outreach, political communication and potential spread of religious extremism. This study affirms that some CVE methodologies potentially confers the media an exit from the vicious cycle of "Al-Shabaab - Media symbiosis" through contextualized and "pro-active CVE communication" with potential to attain an inspiring "communities' CVE resilience - media symbiosis." Pacifying the fear of cultural obliteration, amplifying our common humanity, and exposing the contradictions between the dream and reality of religious extremism could win hearts and dissuade potential recruits from getting recruited and radicalized. Countering the lure to religious extremism through sociological and ideological context is, potentially, a common resolve for communities and the mass media.

2.2.1. Women and Religious Extremism

This study identified two distinct roles of women that have ramifications on religious extremism. The study found that in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale some mothers whose children are active in the Al-Shabaab extremist networks support the recruitment of other women and men in supporting religious extremism. For instance some female spouses challenge their male spouses to proof that they are "real men" and join extremist groups like other men. Essentially some women support the radicalization of adult and youthful males as well as adult and youthful females. The role of mothers is significant because the recruiters use them as agents to introduce extremist aspirations and ideas into the family unit.

Conversely the study found that where the mother-child bond and family ties are strong the mothers, and other females, who disapprove extremism are most likely to be effective in dissuading their female and male relatives from joining and supporting extremism networks. For example, some mothers offer a narrative of suffering mothers when their children and husbands are recruited and travel for intensive radicalization in Somalia or Middle East. This way the some recruited females are touched and make a decision to return home for purposes of pacifying the suffering of their mother and other female relatives. The finding suggests that the de-radicalization process as well as the rehabilitation and integration process is likely to benefit more positively by appropriately integrating the role of gender in countering violent extremism.

Due to unsubstantiated generalizations and assumptions, some counter-terrorism operations profile males as more likely to be recruited into extremism groups. Thus during FGDs and other discussions

pertaining to CVE female respondents are more willing to discuss issues pertaining to religious extremism. This again suggests that CVE initiatives are more likely to be impactful by factoring the role of gender in CVE.

The study was informed that there is increasing presence of female Al-Shabaab members within Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale. This finding is supported by recent developments where females have been arrested after launching terror attacks targeting security installations such as police stations in Mombasa. The respondents averred that the Al-Shabaab trend suggests increased focus on recruiting females. The focus on recruiting and radicalizing women could be related to the realization by Al-Shabaab that general profiling by security agents targets males and thus making women extremists more effective for recruitment, radicalization, surveillance and other activities supportive of terrorist agenda.

Another common trend identified by respondents is that young girls are recruited for marriage by Al-Shabaab extremists. The young girls are usually promised prestigious marriages, wealthy living and healthy spiritual life in furtherance of Salafi puritanical and martyrdom aspirations.

3. Security and CVE Actors

3.1. The State

Kenya has responded to radicalization and religious extremism through the development of counter-terrorism strategy, increased security surveillance, security operations, community policing, and the Nyumba Kumi initiative.[22]

Kenya Counter – Terrorism Strategy: The Kenya national Counter-Terrorism Strategy has various pillars, including the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA, 2012), the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (POCAMLA, 2009), and the Prevention of Organized Crime Act (POCA, 2010), and the establishment of Kenya Counter Terrorism Center Although the Kenyan Government has enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA, 2012), the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (POCAMLA, 2009), and the Prevention of Organized Crime Act (POCA, 2010), commissioning of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC), and the Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU)[23]. The entire counter-terrorism framework is mired by challenges particularly pertaining to coordination of the criminal justice such as using intelligence as lawful verification for effectual prosecution. The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) is the state's strategic agency tasked with coordinating aspects of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy in cooperation with relevant partners. A significant cooperation is the state's partnership with the European Union and the Government of Denmark that focuses on training of law enforcement Officers as well as the Prisons and Probation Officers. The training module includes identifying patterns and tendencies for radicalization and

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[22] GoK and UNDP, (2015), Strenghtening Community's Capacity against Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kenya: Project Document. GoK and UNDP
[23] GoK and UNDP, (2015), Strenghtening Community's Capacity against Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kenya: Project Document. GoK and UNDP

equipping the officers with responsive tools and methodologies. The NCTC has developed a National Counter Radicalization Strategy (NCRS) whose key focus is strengthening communities' resilience for countering violent extremism in general and particularly religious extremism. The NCRS supports dialogue forums through seven pillars[24], namely the media; psycho-social; faith based; capacity building; political; education and security approaches. The study found that, certainly, the NCTC cultivates strategic cooperation and partnership with community-focused institutions to augment communities' resilience in countering radicalization and religious extremism. The study found that among others, NCTC's community based partners include Kenya Women Muslim Alliance (KEMWA), Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE), and Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance (KEMYA). Further the study found that, indisputably, NCTC in partnership with the UNDP supports intra-faith and inter-faith dialogue for Christian and Muslim communities, leadership and clergy.25 A respondent in Mandera informed this study that the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), through the support of NCTC, convened a National Conference on Security and Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya whose notable output was CVE advocacy and accountability charter for augmenting cooperation, coordination and RE responses. Another respondent in Mombasa informed this study that in April 2014 the Partnership for Peace and Security convened an interactive community security and resilience forum for analyzing challenges pertaining to internal security and identification of CVE mitigation plans. The Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) is generally viewed by stakeholders as a CVE pilot program from 2011 to 2013 with the main target areas being Eastleigh of Nairobi and parts of Kenyan coast.26 KTI fostered moderation, identify and self confidence for youth at risk by supporting them to reject religious extremism. Key methodology involved capacity building among youth and community for moderation and non-violence; empowerment of local youth; and livelihood support for youth. The State has conducted various security operations targeting illegal immigrants and others suspected of supporting radicalization and planning terror activities. For example during the 'Operation Usalama' an estimated 4,000 people were arrested and among them 2,303 were screened, 557 deported, 288 prosecuted and 730 sent back to refugee camps. The state has thwarted numerous terror plans through intensified security surveillance such as intricate screening at ports of entry, additional security workforce in volatile counties, enhanced protection around tourist hotels and international installations, and heightened intelligence gathering and surveillance. The State developed a Community Policing Initiative and a community security system coded '*Nyumba Kumi*' whose basis is a ten-household's interactive security model to ensure that each of the ten household' unit in Kenya becomes accountable to each other and keenly attain requisite awareness on activities within the immediate neighborhood.

Gaps Pertaining to State Security Acumen: Respondents asserted that some of the state' responses are excessive and rely on profiling tendencies that makes communities perceive that the state is intent on implementing economic sabotage against the Somali of Mandera as well as Muslims in Mombasa and Kwale. Respondents in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale stated that some of the state's excesses are counter-productive to CVE because they reinforce perceptions of discrimination,

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[24] The pillars constitute sub-strategies for implementing the general Counter Radicalization Strategy

[25] Assertion by a respondent based in Mandera County of Kenya and collaborated through diverse sources of literature review

[26] Farsight, (2016), Designing Countering Violent Extremism Programs: Considering the impact of a country's political and security context on countering violent extremism programming

repression, marginalization, and entrenchment of socio-economic underdevelopment. Respondents averred that Al-Shabaab recruiters amplify specific actions of security agents, that are deemed deplorable and against the Muslim faith, to recruit, radicalize and prepare Muslim youth for terror' supportive actions. Examples of specific incidences that Al-Shabaab augmented to win sympathy of Muslim youth were storming of mosques within Mombasa to evict Salafi-inclined preachers and youth who were violently taking over mosque from moderate Sufi-Muslim clerics.

In addressing religious extremism the Kenya security agencies predominantly employ a security-inclined approach that is habitually informed by ethnic and religious-based profiling to target suspects of Somali and Muslim identity. An ingrained allegation by respondents in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale is that the mainstream counterterrorism approach is supported by government policy considerations that are majorly reactionary to religious extremism amidst minimal focus on preventive Countering Violent Extremism framework. Respondents stated that security-inclined portico in dealing with religious extremism includes deployment of KDF in Somalia, eventual amalgamation of KDF with AMISOM, heightened border patrols, rising security espionage detours, and increased presence of security personnel around strategic government offices and installations, and other security operations by government security agencies in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale. The ensuing security operations have counterproductive ramifications and enigma concerning encroachment on human rights and liberties. The 2014 Human Rights Watch report alleges that an estimated 4,000 individuals were arrested and detained in Nairobi and Mombasa[27] for 9 days following a security operation of the Kenya security agencies. The operation was a reaction to a wave of Al-Shabaab attacks that had the Kenya security agencies resolve to "detect, disrupt and deter" violent atrocities perpetrated by al-Shabaab. The media also alleged that the operations were based on profiling of individuals of Somali identity, coastal Miji Kenda identity, and Muslim identify and ensuing harassment, assault, unlawful detention, and deportations facilitated by security agencies. A respondent also mentioned that some individuals that were targeted on the basis of ethnicity and religion were required to pay bribes to avoid arrest and/or deportations. The HRW allegations bring to the core the alleged slackness and susceptible nature of some security as well as immigration personnel. The government justified the operations as measures to remove illegal aliens from Kenya and transfer individuals with refugee documents to refugee camps.[28] Assessing legal and procedural legitimacy, this report finds that the operations harbors violations of diverse nature, example being that deportation of Somali refugees in Kenya to Mogadishu contravenes UNHCR guidelines on return to Somalia and this exposed Kenya susceptibility of violating international law obligations. Worse still, the reported absence of transparency and legal thresholds while arresting, detaining and deporting the suspects is tantamount to entrenching a perception of weak rule of law in Kenya. Overall this finding brings to the core a potential challenge pertaining to facilitating Countering Violent Extremism initiatives amidst human rights violations, permeated by a culture of impunity, that adversely affect profiled persons from minority ethnic and religious groups. According to a respondent in Changamwe of Mombasa County[29], an inadvertent reverse effect of the security

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[27] Source: 2014 Human Rights Watch (HRW)

[28] A respondent quoting the Interior Cabinet Secretary Joseph Ole Lenku; this assertion is authentic and is supported by the 2014 report by HRW

[29] Key Informant Interview with a village elder in Changamwe

operations is reinforced perception of marginalization and victimization of Somali people and Muslims particularly among the youth in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale counties. The consequential effects are a wave of disgruntlement among ethnic Somali people in Mandera, and Muslims in Mombasa and Kwale, that pushes young people to join Al-Shabaab, undergo basic radicalization and gradually joins the ranks of religious extremists. The above assertion notwithstanding, this report reiterates that counterterrorism strategies are likely to be more effective in dealing with religious extremism if they are embedded with a proactive and preventive framework based on dialogue, cooperation and partnership between stakeholders such as Somali and Muslim constituencies, CSOs, CBOs, peace and mediation platforms, youth and women-led organizations, as well as national-level and county-level security agencies in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale counties. The study affirmed that the concept of "Social Dialogue Ambassadors" as espoused by APFO and CRISP is relevant, timely and holds gargantuan potential for transforming the milieu on religious extremism that hitherto harbors some conundrum of suspicion and mistrust amidst allegations of heavy handedness of security apparatus. Another manifest challenge pertains to weak inter-agency coordination particularly on aspects of resource sharing, communication and conversion of intelligence from diverse agencies into admissible data that supports multi-sectoral preventive framework by relevant state actors such as administration, security, judicial and penitentiary institutions such as prisons. An effective Countering Violent Extremism platform should have ongoing inter-agency consultative and control mechanism for joint State Actors and Non State Actors (NSA).

3.2. Other CVE Actors[30]

The study found that CVE efforts in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale benefits from efforts by various non-state actors, mainly local Civil Society Organizations, who work in partnership with the state and International Civil Society Organizations. Among others the local Civil Society Organizations include Non Governmental Organizations, Community Based Organizations, Women Groups, Youth Groups, Faith Based Organizations and international Civil Society Organizations (ICSOs/INGOs).

4. Conclusion and Recommendations

4.1. Conclusion

Al Shabaab has intensified recruitment and radicalization efforts within Eastern Kenya counties of Mandera, Wajir and Garissa, as well as in Lamu, Mombasa and Kwale at the Coast. The escalation of religious extremism is not notwithstanding the government of Kenya CVE efforts. This situation affirms the need for strengthened community-led and community-based resilience. Community resilience is likely to be more sustainable if organized and structured community institutions, groups and organizations taking frontline leadership for CVE efforts. The capacity of youth-led and women-led groups and organizations is particularly significant for embedding communities' CVE resilience.

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[30] Refer to appendix one for a detailed inventory of other CVE actors

Findings of this study affirm that the threat of Al-Shabaab in Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale is still a reality amidst changes in tactics and complexity by recruiters. For example the focus on recruiting female extremist is a new trend for Al-Shabaab designed to have radicalized members evade security operations. The prevailing threat emanating from religious extremism affirms the urgent need for intensifying Counter-Violent Extremism through strategic and innovative community initiatives. While this study sampled Mandera, Mombasa and Kwale Counties, the prevailing trend is relevant for the entire six target Eastern Kenya counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu, Mombasa and Kwale under the "Social Dialogue Ambassadors: Countering Religious Extremism in Kenya Through Youth Involvement."

4.2. Recommendations

State Actors

1. Support efforts that strengthen the capacity of County-level governance in entrenching participatory governance and protection of social-cultural and political rights, as well as human rights

2. Delineate values, principles and standards that constitute government's thresholds in addressing religious extremism. Such thresholds should include commitment to international human rights law, commitment to the Bill of Rights as embedded in the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, and other policy, strategies and laws of Kenya that are based on a constitutional framework

3. Embed a Counter Violent Extremism platform (policies, strategies, laws, procedures, programs, projects etc.) elucidating governments' Counter-radicalization and de-radicalization as strategically long-term and sustainable interventions

4. Embed the principle of "Strengthening Human Rights" in missions, goals, programs and interventions that address religious extremism and institute pragmatic mechanism for ensuring commitment to human rights through a multi-sectoral and inter-agency approach. It is imperative that security operations and paramilitary operations adhere to the rule of law by protecting constitutional rights

5. Adhere to best practices emanating from the Global War on Terror (GWOT) towards integrating CVE in trainings for all police and military divisions

6. Consider reframing the official narrative on Counter Violent Extremism and Counter-Terrorism to include securing the porous border with Somalia as a high priority commitment that fits within an amended *"Operation Linda Nchi", to include* revising the immigration processes and systems for curbing human smuggling and trafficking

7. Support participatory Madrassa and Mosque reform that is Muslim-driven to institute a standardized Madrassa education framework and Mosque management parameters

8. Nurture a pro-active State and Non State Actors cooperation and partnerships to consolidate and harmonize synergy of diverse stakeholders including the political, civic, religious, socio-cultural, and economic sectors through multi-sectoral and multi-agency programming

Non State Actors focusing on CSOs

1. Initiate programming efforts that strengthen, nurture and protect local resilience to violent extremism. For example there is need to strengthen County-level peace committees, local peace champions and social-dialogue ambassadors

2. Enhance efforts that raise awareness about local rights, communities' rights, as well as responsibilities, for purposes of entrenching authentic CVE initiatives that are relevant, responsive, preventive and community-led

3. Integrate peace education in CVE programming

4. Support efforts that link local CVE actions with national CVE policies and initiatives

5. Strengthen women-led community based groups/organizations and institutions for embedding locally sustainable community resilience

6. Enhance the role of youth-led community-based groups/organizations and institutions in embedding locally sustainable community resilience

7. Design and implement CVE interventions that attain requisite thresholds pertaining to values, principles and best practices for community participation, local ownership, transparency and coordination

8. Design and implement CVE interventions that pro-actively responds to the local context in terms of specific CVE needs, perceptions, vulnerabilities, resilience and sustainability potential

9. Integrate participatory monitoring and evaluation (PME) through inclusiveness and community participation throughout the program/project life cycle (needs identification, inception, design, implementation, and evaluation)

10. Where partnership is allowable ensure that vetting, mapping and targeting guidelines and procedures are documented to facilitate transparency in selecting credible partners who adhere to thresholds of tolerance for diversity, legitimacy in Countering Violent Extremism, as well as ethical and integrity thresholds

11. Institutionalize a platform of Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation that supports documentation, learning, reporting/dissemination, adapting and sustainability as assessed through a combination of logical framework and results based management standards

12. Support efforts that strengthen the capacity of County-level governance in entrenching participatory governance and protection of social-cultural and political rights, as well as human rights

Non State Actors focusing on FBOs (Mosques, Madrassa and Imams)

1. Cooperate and partner with national and county governments to implement reforms targeting the Madrassa education system and particularly to design a standardized Madrassa curriculum and syllabus. An entry point for introducing Madrassa' reform ideas and concepts is designing of modest strategic documents for Madrassa and Mosques that can gradually broaden their mandate and legitimacy to accommodate debates for Madrassa education reforms. The reform agenda has to adhere to the values of Muslim integration and Muslim rights to Islamic faith

2. Cooperate and partner with both State and other Non State Actors to facilitate effective, legitimate and community-based Counter Violent Extremism interventions

Appendix One: Key CVE Actors

Table 2: Inventory of Key CVE Actors - mainly Civil Society Organizations (CSOs/NGOs) and International CSOs (ICSOs/INGOs)

Inventory of Key CVE Actors: Mainly Civil Society Organizations (CSOs/NGOs) and International CSOs (ICSOs/INGOs)

No.	Actor	Target County	Programming Focus	Gaps	Strength
1.	Focused Approach Development Concern (FADC)	• Mandera	• Peace and stability for communities • Countering Violent Extremism • Governance, Democracy and Human Rights	• Inadequate funding	• Respected CVE actor • Coordinates the Mandera Peace and Stability Network • Has proven legitimacy & has established effective partnership with Mandera County Peace Committee and Mandera Mediation Council • Has linkages with County Government of Mandera
2.	Mandera Peace and Stability Network	• Mandera	• Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation • Countering Violent Extremism • Livelihood Security	• Inadequate funding • Weak programming capacity	• Network of credible and community-based CVE actors
3.	Mandera County Peace Committee (MCPC)	• Mandera	• Governance, Democracy and Human Rights • Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation • Countering Violent Extremism	• Inadequate funding • Weak programming capacity	• Works with community-based partners • Has transnational appeal and respected by communities in Kenya and Somalia • Has linkages with County Government of Mandera

			• Livelihood Security		
4.	Mandera Mediation Council (MMC)	• Mandera	• Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation • Human Rights • Countering Violent Extremism • Livelihood Security	• Inadequate funding	• Has a broad-based resource persons including respected Imams and other clerics
5.	Coast Education Center (COEC)	Kwale	1. Countering Violent Extremism 2. Socio-Economic Empowerment 3. Gender Mainstreaming	4. Inadequate funding	• Supports women by linking them with small savings and loans towards embedding self-reliance and ability to provide for themselves and their families • CVE Interventions: Empowers women to speak out and to share their stories to prevent the radicalization of other husbands and sons
6.	Chain of Change	Matuga – Kwale	• Governance, Democracy and Human Rights • Conflict Transformation • Countering Violent Extremism	• Inadequate funding and lack of office space	• A respected CBO that has won confidence of communities and County Government of Kwale • Retains credible network with Msambweni Human Rights Watch and COEC in supporting Countering Violent Extremism
7.	Msambweni Human Rights Watch (MHRW)	Kwale	• Human Rights • Governance and Democracy	• Does not have strong focus	• Msambweni Human Rights Watch partners with a range of CBOs in entrenching Human Rights Agenda, Governance, Democracy, Human Rights and Countering Violent Extremism • Human Rights Focus is appropriate for addressing CVE issues such as marginalization

					and human rights violations
8.	Kenya Community Support Center (KECOSCE)	• Mombasa • Kilifi • Lamu	• Democratic Governance • Economic Development and Asset Management • Peace Building, Security and Conflict Mitigation • Urban Development and Governance	• Inadequate funding	• Focus on integrated approach to radicalization and violent extremism in Coast region of Kenya • Strengthening women voices against violent extremism • School mentorship on dangers of radicalization and violent extremism
9.	Human Rights Agenda (HURIA)	• Kwale	• Human rights • Governance and Democracy	• Inadequate funding	• Is a credible and respected member of County-wide CVE stakeholders
10.	Kwacha Afrika	• Mombasa • Kilifi • Taita Taveta	• Governance • Human Rights • Countering Violent Extremism	• Limited focus on CVE	• Focus on Violent extremism, radicalization and land-related grievances for groups of vulnerable and marginalized people including women, youth and people with disabilities • Utilizes creative methodologies including magnet and community theater • Has a broad reach including Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi and Taita Taveta
11.	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM)	• Lamu • Tana River • Mandera • Kwale	• Interfaith and interreligious dialogue • Countering Violent Extremism	• Limited programming capacity	• Retains a broad reach including Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi, Taita Taveta, Lamu, Garissa, Wajir and Mandera • Has respected resource persons including Imams and scholars

		• Taita Taveta • Garissa • Wajir			• Retains community, county and national networks
12.	Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics	• Mombasa • Kilifi • Kwale • Taita Taveta • Tana River • Lamu	• Peace, Security for Development(PSD)	• Limited programming capacity • Inadequate funding • Limited CVE orientation	• Has a strong Interfaith and interreligious focus • Retains community-level presence in Mombasa, Kilifi, Kwale, Taita Taveta, Tana River and Lamu
13.	Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI)	• Mombasa • Kwale • Lamu • Taita Taveta • Kilifi	• Governance • Human Rights • Countering Violent Extremism	• Has been a target by the state for its vocal stance on human rights violations in the context of CVE	• Maintains county and community-level presence in Mombasa, Kilifi, Kwale, Taita Taveta, Tana River and Lamu counties • Has community, county and national appeal
14.	Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK)	• Mombasa • Kwale • Lamu • Taita Taveta • Kilifi • Mandera • Wajir • Garissa	• Interfaith and interreligious dialogue • Countering Violent Extremism	• Has been a target of extremists for its open CVE interventions	• Maintains county and community-level presence in Mombasa, Kilifi, Kwale, Taita Taveta, Tana River and Lamu counties • Has community, county and national appeal

		• Tana River			
15.	USAID CVE		• Vulnerability to and penetration by extremist groups and ideologies	• The entity is not a direct implementing agency but rather supports local partners	• Supports partners such as Tuna Uwezo, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, other Muslim leaders, scholars, and institutions • Building on the groundwork laid by the Kenya Transition Initiative (2011-2014) • Community based engagement with youth, women, and community leaders on countering context-specific drivers of violent extremism
16.	Yes Youth Can!	• Garissa • Wajir • Mandera	• Youth empowerment in governance, democracy and human right s	• The entity is not a direct implementing agency but rather supports local youth-led CBOs	• Supports youth-led dialogue forums such as bunges ("parliaments" in Kiswahili). The bunges offer at-risk youth the opportunity to join legitimate village- and county-based organizations that provide a platform for dialogue between youth and county governance structures. • Partnered with Kenyan government institutions to create two new Sharia-compliant savings and credit cooperatives for the youth • Supports youth to produce and deliver radio shows that engage youth people on governance issues, peace and security, and social issues like early marriage
17.	United Nations Development Programme	• National through partners	• Deepening foundations for Peacebuilding and Community Security in Kenya	• The entity is not a direct implementing agency but rather supports national and transnational-	• Supports credible partners such as National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC), and partnership for Peace and

				level partners	Security (PfPS)
18.	Strengthening Community Resilience against Violent Extremism (SCORE)	• Kilifi • Kwale • Lamu, Mombasa • Taita Taveta • Tana Rivers,	• Inclusive civil society with the view of addressing the root causes of violent extremism whilst reducing the allure of potentially radicalizing message	• The entity is not a direct implementing agency but rather supports local and national-level partners	• Strengthen community CVE resilience while supporting functionality and technical capability of targeted CSOs on conflict mitigation and CVE • Supports credible partners such as Supreme Council Of Kenya Muslim (SUPKEM), KWACHA Afrika, Tana River Peace Reconciliation & Development, Coast Education Centre (COEC), Kikozi Programme Group, Management of Arid Zones Initiatives & Development Options (MAZIDO) International, National Council Churches of Kenya (NCCK), Human Rights Agenda (HURIA), Diani Chale Management Trust (DCMT), Haki Africa, Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE), Likoni Community Development Program (LICODEP), Moving the Goalpost (MTG), Sustainable Development Solutions (SDS), and Ummah Initiative Group (UIG)
19.	**Other Key CVE Stakeholders** 1. National Government 2. County Governments 3. Kenya Security Forces 4. Politicians and elites 5. Militia groups and Communal militias 6. Pastoralist Communities 7. Indigenous Communities				

	8. Kenyan Somalis
	9. Interreligious community: Muslims, Christians, Hindus, African Traditional Religion/Shrines etc.
	10. Young people
	11. The international community
	12. Al-Shabaab and Al-Hijra

Appendix Two: Source of Primary Data – Inventory of Interviews

Table 3: Source of primary data - Inventory of Interviews:

No.	Date	County	Description of Interview	Remarks
1.	• 31st Jan2017 • 1st Feb 2017	Mombasa	• Key Informant Interviews at Likoni, Mvita, Kisauni, Changamwe, Miritini and Bamburi • FGD at Changamwe • FGD at Majengo	Names of respondents and institutions are offered optimal confidentially due to nature of the study
2.	• 3rd Feb 2017 • 4th Feb 2017	Kwale	• Key Informant Interviews at Kwale, Ukunda and Lunga Lunga • FGD at Matuga • FGD at Ukunda	
3.	• 10th Feb 2017 • 11th Feb 2017	Mandera	• Key Informant Interviews at Banissa, Rhamu, Mandera Central and Fino • FGD at Rhamu • FGD at Banissa • FGD at Mandera Central	

Appendix Three

Enriching the Conflict analysis report

The 6 counties present in the workshop provided key information about their counties. It was categorized into: stakeholders, initiatives/actions, gaps/ entry points and open questions/comments. These contributions will be annexed to the Conflict Analysis report.

LAMU COUNTY	
Stakeholders	**Gaps/Entry points**
• Kikozi Program Group • Sustainable Development Solutions (SDS) • LEVCO • MUHURI	• Friction between security agencies and community. There is no awareness for security. • Tribal friction • Government oppression- it's a challenge

• CIPK • County government • Kiunga Youth Bunge	obtaining National identity cards • Historical injustice (marginalization)
Initiatives/action • Community dialogues • Inter faith forums • Ongoing Lamu CVE strategic plan • Cultural activities promoting peace • Youth empowerment program • Nyumba kumi policing initiative	

GARISSA COUNTY	
Stakeholders CSO- Road International NGOs- IOM, UNHCR SUPKEM Women groups Security agents National Government County Government Community policing Kenya Police Reservists Elders Peace Committee	**Gaps/ Entry points** • Unemployment • Corruption • Radical preachers • Social media influence • Marginalization • Unequal distribution of resources • Peer pressure influence • Fanaticism
Initiatives • Peace/ cohesion/conflict resolutions	**Comments** • Most programs have been implemented without

• Youth empowerment/ livelihood programs • County counter terrorism law adopted • Recruitment of security personnel • Bottom up approach- locals involved • Distribution of IEC materials • Nyumba kumi	piloting or conducting a baseline survey hence limited impact. • Radicalization cases do reduce if all stakeholders are engaged in the process

KWALE COUNTY	
Stakeholders	**Gaps/ Entry points**
Religious leaders- Madrassa teachers Affected women on violent extremism National/ County Terrorism initiatives	• CVE coordination mechanism at the County level • Madrassa curriculum for Kwale County • Psychosocial support for youth in Kwale county • Establishment of County Policing Act in all counties.

WAJIR COUNTY	
Stakeholders	**Gaps/Entry points**
• Wajir Peace Development Committee • Humanitarian International development Association • Wajir County Peace committee • National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) • Community policing units • Wajir County Government • County commissioner's office	• Lack of adequate funding for specific CVE activities • Lack of youth and women CVE initiatives • Peacebuilding initiatives are mainly for elders. There are no youth and women leaders. • Lack of trust on government by the community. There is minimal involvement of the community in CVE.
Initiatives	**Questions**
• Wajir County Peace committee peace building. There is no specific initiative on CVE • HIVA- CVE is voluntary community based	• Is there a possibility of extension? • How do we strengthen networking and linkages? • Can we consider possibility of joint proposal development between all partners?

Mombasa County

Stakeholders	Gaps/entry points
Local youth groups Women groups Community policing Peace committees Junior police officers County government	• Engaging corporates in CVE • Lack of coordinated CSOs actions or activities in CVE • Lack of appreciation of cultural diversity (Swahili culture)
Initiatives • Police/ community engagement • Social media interactions • EWER by KECOSE • Women CVE charter by COEC • Mombasa CVE action plan is ongoing • Strong cities initiative	**Comment** • CVE needs to be addressed from different perspectives- social/economic/political- and include everyone as a stakeholder.

Mandera County	
Stakeholders Women for peace and development Youth for peace and development Community policing National Drought Management Authority **Initiative/actions** • Peacebuilding initiatives • Mandera county Peace committee • Women for peace development	**Gaps/Entry point** • Limited funding for CVE • Youth CVE charter • Embrace culture

Appendix Four: References

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